Opinion & Analysis

PRC constitution changes: Impact on domestic politics


China's National People's Congress (NPC) has voted to remove presidential terms limits by 2,958 in favour and two against (with three abstentions), potentially allowing President Xi Jinping to rule indefinitely. The NPC is meeting from March 5 to 20 to vote on a number of proposed constitutional changes.

The change comes after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee announced proposed amendments to the PRC’s constitution.

The term limit change is getting the most attention. But there are further notable amendments, including the incorporation  of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” into the constitution. Further language highlighting the role of the Party and socialist values has also been included.

The following are expert views on what the proposed changes mean for China's domestic politics.


Implications for domestic politics


Xi’s actions take China backwards politically

“President Xi Jinping’s move to formally consolidate his power by doing away with the two-term rule was not unexpected by China watchers. What is unexpected is the strong pushback on social media in China and on Chinese-language sites outside China.

Xi’s actions take China backwards politically. As Mao did before him, bit by bit Xi appears to have cowed every possible source of opposition to his rule: The military, the other factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the intellectuals, the media.

But social media gives the non-elite in China, as well as Chinese citizens living outside China, a voice they never had before. So it is not game over just yet.”

Anne-Marie Brady, University of Canterbury 

Leadership successions remains major issue for CCP

“Given the recent developments, it seems fair to say that China is unlikely to democratise any time soon.

While the growing centralisation of power under Xi is problematic, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has thus far proved itself to be resilient and adaptive (in the face of the momentous changes associated with the end of the Cold War, China’s economic reforms, and the consequences of Tiananmen Square). Nevertheless, we seem to be entering a bold new era of uncertainty.

The National People’s Congress is likely to remove the two-term limit on China’s President. This is a significant step as it was widely assumed that China’s elite politics had become institutionalised under a collective leadership (and that major decisions were based on a consensus among the elite). This routine institutionalisation that has been the hallmark of the post-Mao period was most vividly demonstrated in the procedure that set the two-term limit (and the age-70 rule for the retirement of Politburo members).

The removal of the two-term limit shows that leadership succession remains a major issue for the CCP. It is noteworthy that both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were handpicked by Deng Xiaoping. China-watchers were already expecting that Xi would continue to stay on beyond 2022 as no potential successor was included among the members of the Politburo after the 19th Communist Party Congress in October 2017.

At the same time, China has moved away from the principle of collective leadership under Xi as he has concentrated power in his own hands by purging senior political (and even military) leaders. In fact, some analysts believe that Xi is cultivating a personality cult. They worry about the consequences of a Mao-like all powerful leader for Chinese politics and society.

In a nutshell, the recent changes mean that China is not on the path to democratisation.

– Manjeet Pardesi, Victoria University of Wellington

Reactionary moves celebrated as ‘political innovation’

(The following is an excerpt from “A Landscape Desolate and Bare”, China Heritage)

“Since the abdication of the last dynastic house in 1912, China’s imperial canker has never been entirely eliminated. Of course, in today’s People’s Republic the state media offers up convoluted folderol and mind-numbing detail regarding the collective and consultative nature of the country’s political system. The reality is that the country is authoritarian in nature; it is organised according to a top-down Bolshevik Party structure while employing various charismatic elements of late-traditional statecraft; state mechanisms are rigidly hierarchical; and comrade-citizen-consumers are regarded as productive assets, unless they become white-anting nay-sayers. In everyday attitudes towards power and privilege, along with an official and private language that is steeped in un-democratic notions, an autocratic temper continues to suffuse the life of China’s party-state.

“An overt embrace of the imperial era has been evident from the mid 1990s when, gradually, the Manchu-Qing dynasty — excoriated for most of the twentieth century as a non-Han, conquest dynasty that through political ineptitude and corruption had allowed Eternal China fall prey to foreign imperialist aggression — was incorporated into the Official China Story, that is the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist historical narrative delineating China’s fall and revival. As the party-state formulated ways to talk about the future in the new millennium, it selectively embraced the country’s Golden Age; among other things, it did so by employing such  dynastic terms as the Prosperous Age 盛世. In this and in a myriad of other ways, the authorities alerted attentive students of the Chinese world to the importance of understanding the gravitational pull of the past.

“In defense of the abolition of term limits on state leaders, that is, with the granting of what I call ‘terminal tenure’ to the Chinese leader Xi Jinping, propagandists have energetically celebrated what is in effect a reactionary move as ‘political innovation’, what they hail as New Style Party Politics 新型政黨制度. Reaction masquerades as reform; the dangers of the past are repackaged as the hope for a sustainable future. China’s propagandists attempt thereby to nullify the claims of western liberal democracies that they alone offer an equitable, self-correcting system that, for all of its faults, can best fulfill the needs and realise the aspirations of modern humanity.”

Geremie Barmé, The Wairarapa Academy for New Sinology

Stability at the top may outweigh risks of policy uncertainty

Term limits for the Chinese presidency were introduced by Deng Xiaoping to avoid the leadership succession issues that have troubled China in the past. The other major leadership offices in China, such as the General Secretary of CCP Central Committee, and the Chairman of CCP Central Military Commission, have never been subject to term limits. This proposed change on presidency term is not unexpected given that in the 19th CCP National Congress last year no potential successor to President Xi was appointed to the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

“It is likely that the amendment has been proposed because the CCP leadership feels that the present policy challenges and the importance of policy continuity outweigh the risks of leadership succession issues that concerned Deng. The proposed amendment is the evidence of Xi’s firm control of the political and party apparatus as he seeks to strengthen the party’s control over the rapid social changes that are occurring in China. It also underscores Xi’s desire to restore China to what he considered its rightful place as a global great power.

“Should President Xi continue onto a third term, the constitutional change will lessen the usual personal, institutional and policy uncertainty that accompanies a leadership succession every 10 years in China. This may be desirable given that China has been undergoing massive long-term economic and military restructuring and embarked on the Belt and Road initiative. Stability at the top, to some extent, may enable better chances of successful policy outcomes.”

Xiang Gao, Eastern Institute of Technology, Auckland

Changes move away from culture of groupthink

“There are two key changes to consider here. The first is the proposal to drop the term limit on the office of the President. The second is the proposed constitutional amendment to add “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” as a guiding principle. The implications of both changes are to further strengthen and centralise Xi’s power. The latter measure effectively makes Xi’s word the law of the land. However, it isn’t clear how exactly this move fits with the larger objective of “developing the rule of law”, as the Party articulated.

“What’s especially interesting about these proposals is they signal a shift in the way internal Party politics work. Under predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, there was a much stronger emphasis on groupthink and collegial rule, rather than a concentration of power in the hands of one person. Both the Jiang and Hu presidencies also established informal norms of succession to ensure smooth leadership transitions every 10 years. This mattered because such junctures were seen as potential weak points, where the rule of the Party could be undermined by political infighting and factionalism. “Intra-Party democracy” became a way of keeping these divisions in check.

“Now, with Xi’s announcements, it seems that these informal procedures are being done away with, and that Xi seeks to retain power by concentrating it in himself rather than devolving it.”

Stephen Noakes, University of Auckland

Changes will intensify political tensions

“The constitutional changes, particularly to remove the term limits for PRC President, will intensify tensions among different political forces over the future direction of China and how China’s overall political system works. It clearly shows which political force is prevailing and how “political reform” will be organized and what it is to achieve. This is a milestone in the years of political battle. If however we see this as part of the century long contention between different political forces and ideologies over how to organise the Chinese state, the tensions will probably continue. 

“All signs suggest the proposal for constitutional changes was agreed at the 19th Party Congress last November. It is just a matter of timing to take it to the public. It suggests this is a well-organised, high level initiative for large-scale institutional change in how the overall political system works.  The special CPC central committee meeting in the last few days outlines key areas of reform in Party and State institutions. Going beyond the discursive language and political rhetoric, we probably can see the leadership is thinking to develop a Presidential system out of the two separate sets of existing Party and state institutions. This will not be a collective leadership centred around the Politburo in the Party institutions, nor a dual head government with state responsibilities concentrated on Prime Minister and the State council. It probably will be a President with real state authority and responsibilities, assisted directly by chief councillors in different mega policy areas. A key to this is to incorporate and rationalise Party and state institutions.  The constitutional changes appear to be just part of this large initiative.”

Xiaoming Huang, Victoria University of Wellington

Questions raised about leadership transition

China’s proposed constitutional arrangements focus on a strengthening of the role of CCP in government, economy and society.

The most controversial proposal is to remove the term limit on the President and Vice-President that was adopted in 1982. This can be interpreted as a rollback of the institutionalisation of leadership transition and a strengthening of President Xi’s leadership. Other key proposals include the introduction of Xi’s “new thought”; sections on the United Front and ethnic relations; the addition of the phrase “community with shared future for humanity”; a renewed stress on CCP leadership and core socialist values; as well as the addition of new supervisory commissions to the structure of the state.

This suggests the ongoing strengthening of the dominant role of the CCP in Chinese governance and society, signals a commitment to developing socialism (with Chinese characteristics) as a governing philosophy, and raises questions about how long Xi will remain President and what this means for leadership transition in China.

Jason Young, Victoria University of Wellington; New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre

 

Read expert views on what China's constitutional changes mean for international relations and New Zealand-China ties.

– Asia Media Centre